Combining Deduction Modulo and Logics of Fixed-Point Definitions by Baelde, David & Nadathur, Gopalan
ar
X
iv
:1
20
4.
62
36
v1
  [
cs
.L
O]
  2
7 A
pr
 20
12
Combining Deduction Modulo and
Logics of Fixed-Point Definitions
David Baelde
IT University of Copenhagen
Gopalan Nadathur
University of Minnesota
Abstract—Inductive and coinductive specifications are widely
used in formalizing computational systems. Such specifications
have a natural rendition in logics that support fixed-point defi-
nitions. Another useful formalization device is that of recursive
specifications. These specifications are not directly complemented
by fixed-point reasoning techniques and, correspondingly, do not
have to satisfy strong monotonicity restrictions. We show how to
incorporate a rewriting capability into logics of fixed-point defini-
tions towards additionally supporting recursive specifications. In
particular, we describe a natural deduction calculus that adds a
form of “closed-world” equality—a key ingredient to supporting
fixed-point definitions—to deduction modulo, a framework for
extending a logic with a rewriting layer operating on formulas.
We show that our calculus enjoys strong normalizability when the
rewrite system satisfies general properties and we demonstrate
its usefulness in specifying and reasoning about syntax-based
descriptions. The integration of closed-world equality into de-
duction modulo leads us to reconfigure the elimination principle
for this form of equality in a way that, for the first time, resolves
issues regarding the stability of finite proofs under reduction.
I. Introduction
Fixed-point definitions constitute a widely used specification
device in computational settings. The process of reasoning
about such definitions can be formalized within a logic by
including a proof rule for introducing predicates from their
definition, and a case analysis rule for eliminating such predi-
cates in favor of the definitions through which they might have
been derived. For example, given the following definition of
natural numbers
nat 0 △= ⊤ nat (s x) △= nat x
the introduction and elimination rules would respectively build
in the capabilities of recognizing natural numbers and of
reasoning by case analysis over them. When definitional
clauses are positive, they are guaranteed to admit a fixed point
and the logic can be proved to be consistent. Further, least
(resp. greatest) fixed points can be characterized by adding an
induction (resp. coinduction) rule to the logic. These kinds of
treatments have been added to second-order logic [13], [15],
type theory [17] and first-order logics [14], [18], [20], [22].
The case analysis rule, which corresponds under the Curry-
Howard isomorphism to pattern matching in computations,
is complex in many formulations of the above ideas, and
the (co)induction rules are even more so. By identifying and
utilizing a suitable notion of equality, it is possible to give
these rules a simple and elegant rendition. For example, the
two clauses for nat can be transformed into the following form:
nat x
△
= x = 0 ∨ ∃y. x = s y ∧ nat y
The case analysis rule can then be derived by unfolding a nat
hypothesis into its single defining clause and using elimination
rules for disjunction and equality. However, to obtain the ex-
pected behavior, equality elimination has to internalize aspects
of term equality such as disjointness of constructors; e.g., the
0 branch should be closed immediately if the instantiation of
x has the form s n. The introduction of this separate notion of
equality, which we refer to as closed-world equality, has been
central to the concise formulation of generic (co)induction
rules [20]. Further, fixed-point combinators can be introduced
to make the structure of (co)inductive predicates explicit rather
than relying on a side table of definitions. Thus, the (inductive)
definition of natural numbers may simply be rendered as
µ (λNλx. x = 0 ∨ ∃y. x = s y∧ N y). Fixed point combinators
simplify and generalize the theory, notably enabling mutual
(co)induction schemes from the natural (co)induction rules [2],
[3]. The logics resulting from this line of work, which we
refer to as logics of fixed-point definitions from now on,
have a simple structure that is well-adapted to automated
and interactive proof-search [4], [5]. Moreover, they can be
combined with features such as generic quantification that are
useful in capturing binding structure to yield calculi that are
well-suited to formalizing the meta-theory of computational
and logical systems [10], [11], [16].
Logics featuring (co)inductive definitions can be made more
powerful by adding another genre of definitions: recursive
definitions based on inductive sets. A motivating context for
such definitions is provided by the Tait-style strong normaliz-
ability argument [19], which figures often in the meta-theory
of computational systems. For the simply typed λ-calculus,
this argument relies on a reducibility relation specified by the
following clauses:
red ι e △= sn e
red (t1 → t2) e △= ∀e′. red t1 e′ ⊃ red t2 (e e′)
We assume here that ι is the sole atomic type and that
sn is a predicate that recognizes strong normalizability. The
specification of red looks deceptively like a fixed-point defini-
tion. However, treating it as such is problematic because the
second clause in the definition does not satisfy the positivity
condition. More importantly, the Tait-style argument does
not involve reasoning on red like we reason on fixed-point
definitions. Instead of performing case-analysis or induction
on red, properties are proved about it using an (external)
induction on types and the clauses for red mainly support
an unfolding of the definition once the structure of a type is
known [12]. Generally, recursive definitions are distinguished
by the fact that they embody computations or rewriting within
proofs rather than the case analysis and speculative rewriting
that is characteristic of fixed-point based reasoning.
In this paper, we show how to incorporate the capability
of recursive definitions into logics of fixed-point definitions.
At a technical level, we do this by introducing least and
greatest fixed points and the idea of closed-world equality
into deduction modulo [7], a framework for extending a logic
with a rewriting layer that operates on formulas and terms.
This rewriting layer allows for a transparent treatment of
recursive definitions, but a satisfactory encoding of closed-
world equality (and thus fixed-point definitions) seems outside
its reach. This dichotomy actually highlights the different
strengths of logics of fixed-point definitions and deduction
modulo: while the former constitute excellent vehicles for
dealing with (co)inductive definitions, the rewriting capability
of the latter is ideally suited for supporting recursive def-
initions. By extending deduction modulo with closed-world
equality and fixed points, we achieve a combination of these
strengths. This combination also clarifies the status of our
equality: we show that it is compatible with a theory on terms
and is thus richer than a simple “syntactic” form of equality.
The main technical result of this paper is a strong nor-
malizability property for our enriched version of deduction
modulo. The seminal work in this context is that of Dowek and
Werner [8], who provide a proof of strong normalizability for
deduction modulo that is modular with respect to the rewriting
system being used. In the course of adapting this proof to
our setting, we rework previous logical treatments of closed-
world equality in a way that, for the first time, lets us require
that proofs be finite without sacrificing their stability under
reduction. For the resulting system, we are able to construct a
proof of strong normalizability which follows very naturally
the intended semantics of fixed-point and recursive definitions:
the former are interpreted as a whole using a semantic fixed-
point, while the latter are interpreted instance by instance.
Regarding the normalization of least and greatest fixed-point
constructs, our work adapts that of Baelde [3] from linear
to intuitionistic logic. We use a natural deduction style in
presenting our logic that has the virtue of facilitating future
investigations of connections with functional programming.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we motivate and present our logical system. Section III de-
scribes reductions on proofs. Section IV provides a proof of
strong normalizability that is modular in the rewrite rules being
considered. We use this result to facilitate recursive definitions
in Section V and we illustrate their use in formalizing the
meta-theory of programming languages. Section VI discusses
related and future work.
II. DeductionModulo with Fixed-Points and Equality
We present our extension to deduction modulo in the form
of a typing calculus for appropriately structured proof terms.
This gives us a convenient tool for defining proof reductions
and proving strong normalizability in later sections.
A. Formalizing closed-world equality
We first provide an intuition into our formalization of
the desired form of equality. The rule for introducing an
equality is the expected one: two terms are equal if they are
congruent modulo the operative rewriting relation. Denoting
the congruence by ≡, this rule can simply be
Γ ⊢ t = t′ t ≡ t
′
The novelty is in the elimination rule that must encapsulate the
closed-world interpretation. This can be captured in the form
of a case analysis over all unifiers of the eliminated equality;
the unifiers that are relevant to consider here would instantiate
variables of universal strength, called eigenvariables, in the
terms. One formulation of this idea that has been commonly
used in the literature is the following:
Γ ⊢ t = t′ { Γθi ⊢ Pθi | θi ∈ csu(t, t′) }
Γ ⊢ P
The notation csu(t, t′) is used here to denote a complete set of
unifiers for t and t′ modulo ≡, i.e., a set of unifiers such that
every unifier for the two terms is subsumed by a member of
the set. The closed world assumption is expressed in the fact
that Γ ⊢ P needs to be proved under only these substitutions.
Note in particular that the set of right premises here is empty
when t and t′ are not unifiable, i.e., have no common instances.
The equality elimination rule could have simply used the
set of all unifiers for t and t′. Basing it on csus instead allows
the cardinality of the premise set to be controlled, typically
permitting it to be reduced to a finite collection from an
infinite one. However, a problem with the way this rule is
formulated is that this property is not stable under substitution.
For example, consider the following derivation in which x and
y are variables:
p x, x = y ⊢ x = y (p x, x = y)[y/x] ⊢ (p y)[y/x]
p x, x = y ⊢ p y
If we were to apply the substitution [t1/x, t2/y] to it, the
branching structure of the derivation would have to be changed
to reflect the nature of a csu for t1 and t2; this could well be an
infinite set. A related problem manifests itself when we need
to substitute a proof π for an assumption into the derivation. If
we were to work the proof substitution eagerly through each
of the premises in the equality elimination rule, it would be
necessary to modify the structure of π to accord with the term
substitution that indexes each of the premise derivations. In the
context of deduction modulo, the instantiation in π can create
new opportunities for rewriting formulas. Since the choice of
the “right” premise cannot be determined upfront, the eager
propagation of proof substitutions into equality eliminations
can lead to a form of speculative rewriting which, as we shall
see, is problematic when recursive definitions are included.
We avoid these problems by formulating equality elimina-
tion in a way that allows for the suspension of term and proof
substitutions. Specifically, this rule is
Γ′ ⊢ tθ = t′θ Γ′ ⊢ Γθ { Γθi ⊢ Pθi | θi ∈ csu(t, t′) }
Γ′ ⊢ Pθ
Here, Γ′ ⊢ Γθ means that there is a derivation of Γ′ ⊢ Q
for any Q ∈ Γθ. This premise, that introduces a form of cut,
allows us to delay the propagation of proof substitutions over
the premises that represent the case analysis part of the rule.
Notice also that we consider csus for t and t′ and not tθ and t′θ
over these premises, i.e., the application of the substitution θ is
also suspended. Of course, these substitutions must eventually
be applied. Forcing the application becomes the task of the
reduction rule for equality that also simultaneously selects the
right branch in the case analysis.
Our equality elimination rule also has the pleasing property
of allowing the structure of proofs to be preserved under
substitutions. For example, the proof
p x, x = y ⊢ x = y p x, x = y ⊢ p x (p x)[y/x] ⊢ (p y)[y/x]
p x, x = y ⊢ p y
under the substitution θ := [t1/x, t2/y] becomes
Γ ⊢ (x = y)θ Γ ⊢ (p x)θ (p x)[y/x] ⊢ (p y)[y/x]
Γ ⊢ p t2
where Γ = ( p t1, t1 = t2 ).
B. The logic µNJ modulo
The syntax of our formulas is based on a language of typed
λ-terms. We do not describe this language in detail and assume
only that it is equipped with standard notions of variables and
substitutions. We distinguish o as the type of propositions.
Term types, denoted by γ, are ones that do not contain o.
Predicates are expressions of type γ1 → . . . → γn → o. Both
formulas and predicates are denoted by P or Q. We use p or q
for predicate variables and a for predicate constants. Terms are
expressions of term types, and shall be denoted by t, u or v. We
use x, y or z for term variables. All expressions are considered
up to β- and η-conversion. In addition to that basic syntactic
equality, we assume a congruence relation ≡. In Section V, we
will describe conditions on such a congruence relation that are
sufficient for ensuring the consistency of the logic.
Definition 1. A unifier of u and v is a substitution θ such
that uθ ≡ vθ. A complete set of unifiers for u and v, written
csu(u, v) is a set { θi }i of unifiers of u and v, such that any other
unifier of u and v is of the form θiθ′ for some i and θ′. Note
that complete sets of unifiers may not be unique. However, this
ambiguity will be harmless in our setting.
Definition 2. Formulas are built as follows:
P ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | P ⊃ Q | P ∧ Q | P ∨ Q | ∀x.P | ∃x.P |
t = t′ | (µ B ~t) | (ν B ~t) | (p ~t) | (a ~t)
Here, ∧, ∨ and ⊃ are connectives of type o → o → o, equality
has type γ → γ → o and quantifiers have type (γ → o) →
o for any γ. Expressions of the form a~t are called atomic
formulas. The least and greatest fixed point combinators µ
and ν have the type (τ → τ) → τ for any τ of the form
~γ → o. The first argument for these combinators, denoted by
B, must have the form λpλ~x.P called a predicate operator.
Every predicate variable occurrence must be within such an
operator, bound by the first abstraction in it. An occurrence of
p in a formula is positive if it is on the left of an even number
of implications, and it is negative otherwise and λpλ~x.P is
said to be monotonic (resp. antimonotonic) if p occurs only
positively (resp. negatively) in P. We restrict the first argument
of fixed-point combinators to be monotonic operators.
We now introduce a language of proof terms, and define
type assignment. The terms and typing rules for all but the
equality and fixed point cases are standard (e.g., see [8]).
Following the Curry-Howard correspondence, (proof-level)
types correspond to formulas, typing derivations correspond to
proofs, and the reduction of proof terms corresponds to proof
normalization. The guidelines determining the form of the
new proof terms are that all information needed for reduction
should be included in them and that type checking should be
easily decidable. The details of our choices should become
clear when we present the typing rules.
Definition 3. Proof terms, denoted by π and ρ, are given by
the following syntax rules:
π ::= α | 〈〉 | δ⊥(π)
| λα.π | (π π′)
| 〈π, π′〉 | proj1(π) | proj2(π)
| in1(π) | in2(π) | δ∨(π1, α.π2, β.π3)
| λx.π | (π t)
| 〈t, π〉 | δ∃(π, x.α.π′)
| refl | δ=(Γ, θ, σ, u, v, P, π, (θ′i .πi)i)
| µ(B, ~t, π) | δµ(π, ~x.α.π′)
| ν(π, α.π′) | δν(B, ~t, π)
Here and later, we use α, β, γ to denote proof variables, and
σ to denote substitutions for proof variables. The notation
(θ′i .πi)i in the equality elimination construct stands for a finite,
possibly empty, collection of subterms. In the expression θ.π,
all free variables of π must be in the range of the substitution
θ. Finally, the notation x.π or α.π denotes a binding construct,
i.e., x (resp. α) is bound in π. As usual, terms are identified
up to a renaming of bound variables, and renaming is used to
avoid capture when propagating a substitution under a binder.
Typing judgments are relativized to contexts that are as-
signments of types to finite sets of proof variables. We denote
contexts by Γ, written perhaps with subscripts and superscripts.
Definition 4. A proof term π has type P under the context Γ
if Γ ⊢ π : P is derivable using the rules in Figure 1. We also
Γ ⊢ α : P P ≡ Q, (α : Q) ∈ Γ Γ ⊢ 〈〉 : P P ≡ ⊤
Γ ⊢ π : ⊥
Γ ⊢ δ⊥(π) : P
Γ, α : P1 ⊢ π : P2
Γ ⊢ λα.π : P P ≡ P1 ⊃ P2
Γ ⊢ π : Q ⊃ P Γ ⊢ π′ : Q
Γ ⊢ π π′ : P
Γ ⊢ π1 : P1 Γ ⊢ π2 : P2
Γ ⊢ 〈π1, π2〉 : P
P ≡ P1 ∧ P2
Γ ⊢ π : P1 ∧ P2
Γ ⊢ proji(π) : P′i
P′i ≡ Pi, i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ⊢ π : Pi
Γ ⊢ ini(π) : P P ≡ P1 ∨ P2
Γ ⊢ π : P1 ∨ P2 Γ, α : P1 ⊢ π1 : P Γ, β : P2 ⊢ π2 : P
Γ ⊢ δ∨(π, α.π1, β.π2) : P
Γ ⊢ π : Q
Γ ⊢ λx.π : P P ≡ ∀x.Q
Γ ⊢ π : ∀x.Q
Γ ⊢ π t : P P ≡ Q[t/x]
Γ ⊢ π : Q[t/x]
Γ ⊢ 〈t, π〉 : P P ≡ ∃x.Q
Γ ⊢ π : ∃x.Q Γ, α : Q ⊢ π′ : P
Γ ⊢ δ∃(π, x.α.π′) : P
Γ ⊢ refl : P P ≡ (t = t)
Γ′ ⊢ π : uθ = vθ Γ′ ⊢ σ : Γθ (Γθ′i ⊢ πi : Qθ′i )i
Γ′ ⊢ δ=(Γ, θ, σ, u, v, Q, π, (θ′i .πi)i) : P
(θ′i )i ∈ csu(u, v), P ≡ Qθ
Γ ⊢ π : B (µ B) ~t
Γ ⊢ µ(B, ~t, π) : P P ≡ µ B ~t
Γ ⊢ π : µ B ~t Γ, α : B S ~x ⊢ π′ : S ~x
Γ ⊢ δµ(π, ~x.α.π′) : P P ≡ S ~t
Γ ⊢ π : S ~t Γ, α : S ~x ⊢ π′ : B S ~x
Γ ⊢ ν(π, ~x.α.π′) : P P ≡ ν B ~t
Γ ⊢ π : ν B~t
Γ ⊢ δν(B, ~t, π) : P
P ≡ B (ν B) ~t
Variables bound in proof terms are assumed to be new in instances of typing rules, i.e., they should not occur free in the
base sequent. Specifically, α, β, x are assumed to be new in the introduction rules for implication, universal quantification and
greatest fixed-point, as well as elimination rules for disjunction, existential quantification, equality and least fixed-point.
Fig. 1. µNJ: Natural deduction modulo with equality and least and greatest fixed points
say that Γ′ ⊢ σ : Γ holds if Γ and σ have the same domain
and Γ′ ⊢ σ(α) : Γ(α) holds for each α in that domain.
C. Expressiveness of the logic
The logic µNJ modulo inherits from logics of fixed-point
definitions a simplicity in the treatment of (co)inductive sets
and relations and from deduction modulo the ability to blend
computation and deduction in the course of reasoning. We
illustrate this aspect through a few simple examples here.
Natural numbers may be specified through the following
least fixed point predicate:
nat
de f
= µ (λNλx. x = 0 ∨ ∃y. x = s y ∧ N y)
Specialized for this predicate, the least fixed point rules
immediately give rise to the following standard derived rules:
Γ ⊢ nat 0
Γ ⊢ nat x
Γ ⊢ nat (s x)
Γ ⊢ nat x Γ ⊢ P 0 Γ, P y ⊢ P (s y)
Γ ⊢ P x
y new
Having natural numbers, we can easily obtain the rest of
Heyting arithmetic. Addition may be defined as an inductive
relation, but the congruence also allows it to be defined more
naturally as a term-level function, equipped with the rewrite
rules 0 + y  y and (s x) + y  s (x + y). Treating it in
the latter way allows us to exploit the standard dichotomy
between deduction and computation in deduction modulo to
shorten proofs [6]. For example, (s 0)+ (s 0) = s (s 0) can be
proved in one step by using the fact that the two terms in the
equation are congruent to each other. More general properties
about addition defined in this way must be conditioned by
assumptions about the structure of the terms. For instance,
commutativity of addition should be stated as follows:
∀x∀y. nat x ⊃ nat y ⊃ x + y = y + x
This proposition can be proved by induction on the nat
hypotheses, with the computation of addition being performed
implicitly through the congruence when the structure of the
first summand becomes known. Note that we do not have to
know how to compute csus modulo arithmetic to build that
derivation: all that is needed is the substitutivity principle
∀x∀y. x = y ⊃ P x ⊃ P y which only involves shallow
unification.
III. Reductions on Proof Terms
As usual, we consider reducing proof terms in which an
elimination rule for a logical symbol immediately follows
an introduction rule for the same symbol. Substitutions for
both term-level and proof-level variables play an important
role in describing such reductions. They are defined as usual,
extended as shown on Figure 2 for equality and for the least
and greatest fixed-point constructs. Note that substitutions are
suspended over the parts representing case analysis in the
equality elimination rule as discussed earlier. The next two
lemmas show that this treatment of substitution is coherent.
(δ=(Γ, θ′, σ, u, v, P, π, (θ′′i .πi)i))θ
de f
= δ=(Γ, θ′θ, σθ, u, v, P, πθ, (θ′′i .πi)i)
(δ=(Γ, θ′, σ′, u, v, P, π, (θ′′i .πi)i))σ
de f
= δ=(Γ, θ′, σ′σ, u, v, P, πσ, (θ′′i .πi)i)
(µ(B, ~t, π))θ de f= µ(Bθ,~tθ, πθ) (δµ(π, ~x.α.π′))θ de f= δµ(πθ, ~x.α.π′θ)
(µ(B, ~t, π))σ de f= µ(B, ~t, πσ) (δµ(π, ~x.α.π′))σ de f= δµ(πσ, ~x.α.π′σ)
(ν(π, ~x.α.π′))θ de f= ν(πθ, ~x.α.π′θ) (δν(B, ~t, π))θ de f= δν(Bθ,~tθ, πθ)
(ν(π, ~x.α.π′))σ de f= ν(πσ, ~x.α.π′σ) (δν(B, ~t, π))σ de f= δν(B, ~t, πσ)
Fig. 2. Term and proof-level substitutions into equality, least and greatest fixed-point proof terms
Lemma 1. Term-level substitution preserves type assignment:
Γ ⊢ π : P implies Γθ ⊢ πθ : Pθ.
Proof: This is easily checked by induction on the typing
derivation. An interesting case is that of equality elimination.
Consider the following derivation:
Γ′ ⊢ π : uθ′ = vθ′ Γ′ ⊢ σ : Γθ′ (Γθ′′i ⊢ πi : P′θ′′i )i
Γ′ ⊢ δ=(Γ, θ′, σ, u, v, P′, π, (θ′′i .πi)i) : P
P ≡ P′θ′
By the induction hypothesis, Γ′θ ⊢ πθ : uθ′θ = vθ′θ and Γ′θ ⊢
σθ : Γθ′θ have derivations. From these we build the derivation
Γ′θ ⊢ πθ : uθ′θ = vθ′θ Γ′θ ⊢ σθ : Γθ′θ (Γθ′′i ⊢ πi : P′θ′′i )i
Γ′θ ⊢ δ=(Γ, θ′θ, σθ, u, v, P′, πθ, (θ′′i .πi)i) : Pθ
Lemma 2. If Γ ⊢ π : P and Γ′ ⊢ σ : Γ then Γ′ ⊢ πσ : P.
Proof: This is shown also by induction on the typing deriva-
tion. An interesting case, again, is that of equality elimination.
Consider the following derivation:
Γ ⊢ π : uθ = vθ Γ ⊢ σ′ : Γ′′θ (Γ′′θ′i ⊢ πi : P′θ′i )i
Γ ⊢ δ=(Γ′′, θ, σ′, u, v, P′, π, (θ′i .πi)i) : P
P ≡ P′θ
By the induction hypothesis, Γ′ ⊢ πσ : uθ = vθ and Γ′ ⊢ σ′σ :
Γ′′θ have derivations. From this we build the derivation
Γ′ ⊢ πσ : uθ = vθ Γ′ ⊢ σ′σ : Γ′′θ (Γ′′θ′i ⊢ πi : P′θ′i )i
Γ′ ⊢ δ=(Γ′′, θ, σ′σ, u, v, P′, πσ, (θ′i .πi)i) : P
The most interesting reduction rules are those for the least
and greatest fixed-point operators. In the former case, the rule
must apply to a proof of the form
Γ ⊢ π : B (µ B) ~t
Γ ⊢ µ(B, ~t, π) : µ B ~t Γ, α : B S ~x ⊢ π′ : S ~x
Γ ⊢ δµ(µ(B, ~t, π), ~x.α.π′) : S ~t
This redex can be eliminated by generating a proof of Γ ⊢ S ~t
directly from the derivation of Γ ⊢ π : B (µ B) ~t: doing this
effectively means that we move the redex (cut) deeper into
the iteration that introduces the least fixed point. To realize
this transformation, we proceed as follows:
• Using the derivation π′, we can get a proof of S ~t from
B S ~t. Thus, the task reduces to generating a proof of
B S ~t from B (µ B) ~t.
• Using again π′, we get a derivation for Γ, β : µ B ~x ⊢
δµ(β, ~x.α.π′) : S ~x. If we can show how to “lift” this
derivation over the operator λp.(B p ~t), we obtain the
needed derivation of B S ~t from π : B (µ B) ~t.
For the latter step, we use the notion of functoriality [13]. For
any monotonic operator B, we define the functor FB for which
the following typing rule is admissible:
Γ, α : P ~x ⊢ π : P′ ~x
Γ ⊢ FB(~x.α.π) : (B P) ⊃ (B P′)
Definition 5 (Functoriality, FB(π)). Let B be an operator of
type (~γ → o) → o, and π be a proof such that α : P ~x ⊢ π :
P′ ~x. We define F+B(~x.α.π) of type B P ⊃ B P′ for a monotonic
B and F−B(~x.α.π) of type B P′ ⊃ B P for an antimonotonic B
by induction on the maximum depth of an occurrence of p in
B p through the rules in Figure 3. In these rules, ∗ denotes
any polarity (+ or −) and −∗ denotes the complementary one.
We write F+B(~x.α.π) more simply as FB(~x.α.π).
Checking the admissibility of the typing rule pertaining to
FB is mostly routine. We illustrate how this is to be done by
considering the least fixed point case in Figure 4; the greatest
fixed point case is shown in Figure 7 in the appendices.
The full collection of reduction rules is presented in Fig-
ure 5. Note that the reduction rule for equality is not deter-
ministic as stated: determinism can be forced if needed by
suitable assumptions on csus or by forcing a particular choice
of θ′i and θ′′ in case of multiple possibilities.
Theorem 1 (Subject reduction). If Γ ⊢ π : P and π → π′ then
Γ ⊢ π′ : P.
Proof: This follows from the above substitution lemmas.
For example, consider the equality case. If uθ ≡ vθ then
δ=(Γ′, θ, σ, u, v, P, refl, (θ′i .π′i)i) → π′iθ′′σ where θ = θ′iθ′′. We
have a derivation of Γ′θ′i ⊢ π′i : Pθ′i . Hence, by applying θ′′
and using Lemma 1, Γ′θ ⊢ π′iθ′′ : Pθ must have a derivation.
Finally, since Γ ⊢ σ : Γ′θ has a derivation, by Lemma 2 there
must be one for Γ ⊢ π′iθ′′σ : Pθ.
Proposition 1. For any proof terms π, π′ and ρ and any term
t, π → π′ implies π[ρ/α] → π′[ρ/α] and π[t/x] → π′[t/x].
Proof: Both implications are easily checked.
A proof term is normal if it contains no redexes and it
is strongly normalizable if every reduction sequence starting
F+
λp.p~t
(~x.α.π) = λα.π[~t/~x] F∗λp.Q(~x.α.π) = λβ.β if p does not occur in Q
F∗λp.(B1 p)∧(B2 p)(~x.α.π) = λβ.〈F∗B1(~x.α.π) (proj1(β)), F∗B2(~x.α.π) (proj2(β))〉
F∗
λp.(B1 p)∨(B2 p)(~x.α.π) = λβ.δ∨(β, γ.in1(F∗B1(~x.α.π) γ), γ.in2(F∗B2(~x.α.π) γ))
F∗
λp.(B1 p)⊃(B2 p)(~x.α.π) = λβ.λγ.F∗B2(~x.α.π) (β (F−∗B1 (~x.α.π) γ))
F∗
λp.∀x.(B p x)(~x.α.π) = λβ.λx.F∗λp.B p x(~x.α.π) (β x)
F∗
λp.∃x.(B p x)(~x.α.π) = λβ.δ∃(β, x.γ.〈x, F∗λp.B p x(~x.α.π) γ〉)
F∗
λp.µ (B p)~t(~x.α.π) = λβ.δµ(β, ~x.γ.µ(B P′, ~x, F∗λp.B p (µ (B P′)) ~x(~x.α.π) γ))
F∗
λp.ν (B p)~t(~x.α.π) = λβ.ν(β, ~x.γ.F∗(λp.B p (ν (B P)) ~x)(~x.α.π) δν(B P, ~x, γ))
Fig. 3. Definition of functoriality
Γ, β : µ (B P)~t ⊢ β : µ (B P)~t
Γ, β : µ (B P)~t, γ : B P (µ (B P′)) ~x ⊢ Fλp.B p (µ (B P′)) ~x(~x.α.π) γ : B P′ (µ (B P′)) ~x
Γ, β : µ (B P)~t, γ : B P (µ (B P′)) ~x ⊢ µ(B P′, ~x, . . .) : µ (B P′) ~x
Γ, β : µ (B P)~t ⊢ δµ(β, . . .) : µ (B P′)~t
Γ ⊢ F+
λp.µ (B p)~t(~x.α.π) : µ (B P)~t ⊃ µ (B P′)~t
Fig. 4. Typing functoriality for least fixed-points
(λα.π) π′ → π[π′/α] proji(〈π1, π2〉) → πi δ∨(ini(π), α.π1, α.π2) → πi[π/α]
(λx.π) t → π[t/x] δ∃(〈t, π〉, x.α.π′) → π′[t/x][π/α]
δµ(µ(B, ~t, π), ~x.α.π′) → π′[~t/~x][(Fλp.B p~t(~x.β.δµ(β, ~x.α.π′)) π
)
/α]
δν(B, ~t, ν(π, ~x.α.π′)) → Fλp.B p~t(~x.β.ν(β, ~x.α.π′)) (π′[~t/~x][π/α])
δ=(Γ, θ, σ, u, v, P, refl, (θ′i .πi)i) → πiθ′′σ where θ = θ′iθ′′
Fig. 5. Reduction rules for µNJ proof terms
from it terminates in a normal proof term. The set of strongly
normalizable proof terms is denoted by SN . The normal-
izability of proof terms can be coupled with the following
observation to show the (conditional) consistency of the logic.
Lemma 3. If ≡ is defined by a confluent rewrite system that
rewrites terms to terms and atomic propositions to proposi-
tions, then ⊢ π : ⊥ is not derivable for any normal π.
Proof: This standard observation is not affected by the
rewriting layer, since ⊥ cannot be equated with another logical
connective under the assumptions on ≡, and it is not affected
either by our new constructs, for which progress is ensured:
eliminations followed by introductions can always be reduced.
More details may be found in Appendix I.
IV. Strong Normalizability
In a fashion similar to [8], we now establish strong normal-
izability for proof reductions when the congruence relation
satisfies certain general conditions. The proof is based on the
framework of reducibility candidates, and borrows elements
from earlier work in linear logic [3] regarding fixed-points.
Definition 6. A proof term is neutral iff it is not an introduc-
tion, i.e., it is a variable or an elimination construct.
Definition 7. A set R of proof terms is a reducibility candidate
if (1) R ⊆ SN; (2) π ∈ R and π → π′ implies π′ ∈ R; and (3)
if π is neutral and all of its one-step reducts are in R, then
π ∈ R. We denote by C the set of all reducibility candidates.
Conditions (2,3) are positive and compatible with (1) so that
for any subset S of SN there is a least candidate containing
S . We refer to the operation that yields this set as saturation.
Reducibility candidates, equipped with inclusion, form a com-
plete lattice: the intersection of a family of candidates gives
their infimum and the saturated union gives their supremum.
Having a complete lattice, we can define least and greatest
fixed points of monotonic operators. The ordering and the
observations about it lift pointwise for functions from terms to
candidates, which we call predicate candidates. We use X and
Y ambiguously to denote candidates and predicate candidates.
Definition 8. A pre-model M is an assignment of a function
aˆ from |γ1| × . . . × |γn| to C to each predicate constant a of
type γ1 → . . . γn → o. Here, |γ| denotes the set of (potentially
open) terms of type γ.
Definition 9. Let M be a pre-model, let P be a formula and
let E be a context assigning predicate candidates of the right
types to at least the free predicate variables in P. We define
the candidate |P|E, called the interpretation of P, by recursion
on the structure of P as shown in Figure 6.
To justify this definition, we show simultaneously by an
induction on P that |P|E is a candidate and that it is monotonic
|⊥|E = |⊤|E = |u = v|E = SN |p t1 . . . tn|E = E(p)(t1, . . . , tn) |a t1 . . . tn|E = aˆ(t1, . . . , tn)
|P ⊃ Q|E = { π ∈ SN | π →∗ λα.π1 implies π1[π′/α] ∈ |Q|E for any π′ ∈ |P|E }
|P ∧ Q|E = { π ∈ SN | π →∗ 〈π1, π2〉 implies π1 ∈ |P|E and π2 ∈ |Q|E }
|P1 ∨ P2|E = { π ∈ SN | π →∗ ini(π′) implies π′ ∈ |Pi|E }
|∀x. P|E = { π ∈ SN | π →∗ λx.π′ implies π′[t/x] ∈ |P[t/x]|E for any t }
|∃x. P|E = { π ∈ SN | π →∗ 〈t, π′〉 implies π′[t/x] ∈ |P[t/x]|E }
|µB~t|E = lfp(φ)(~t) where φ(X) = ~t′ 7→ { π ∈ SN | π →∗ µ(B, ~t′, π′) implies π′ ∈ |Bp~t′|E+〈p,X〉 }
|νB~t|E = gfp(φ)(~t) where φ(X) = ~t′ 7→ { π | δν(B, ~t′, π) ∈ |Bp~t′|E+〈p,X〉 }
Fig. 6. Interpretation of formulas as candidates
(resp. anti-monotonic) in E(p) for any variable p that only
occurs positively (resp. negatively) in P; the latter two facts en-
sure that the fixed points assumed in the definition actually ex-
ist, anti-monotonicity being needed because of the covariance
in implication formulas. Preservation of (anti)monotonicity
and satisfaction of the conditions for reducibility candidates
are readily verified in all but the fixed point cases. For the
least fixed point case, |µ B~t|E is easily seen to be a candidate
provided it is well-defined, i.e., if lfp(φ) exists for φ as in
the definition. But this must be so: the induction hypothesis
applied to B p~t′ ensures that φ is a monotonic mapping,
hence it has a least fixed point in the lattice of predicate
candidates. For monotonicity, consider E and E′ differing only
on a variable p that occurs only positively in µ B~t, with
E(p) ⊆ E′(p). Let |µ B~t|E′ = lfp(φ′)~t. Unfolding and using the
induction hypothesis, we have φ(X) ⊆ φ′(X) for any candidate
X, and in particular φ(|µ B~t|E′ ) ⊆ φ′(|µ B~t|E′ ) = |µ B~t|E′ .
The least fixed point being contained in all prefixed points,
we obtain the expected result: |µ B~t|E = lfp(φ) ⊆ |µ B~t|E′ .
Antimonotonicity is established in a symmetric fashion. The
treatment of the greatest fixed point case is similar.
Notation 1. If P is a predicate of type ~γ → o, |P|E denotes the
mapping ~t 7→ |P~t|E. If B is of type (~γ → o) → o, |B|E denotes
the mapping X 7→ |B p|E+〈p,X〉 and if B is a predicate operator
of type (~γ → o) → ~γ → o, |B|E denotes the mapping X 7→
~t 7→ |B p~t|E+〈p,X〉. For conciseness we write directly |BX~t|E for
|λp. B p~t|EX or, equivalently, |B|EX~t.
Lemma 4. Interpretation commutes with second-order substi-
tution: |B[P/p]|E = |B|E+〈p,|P|E〉.
Proof: Straightforward, by induction on B.
We naturally extend the interpretation to typing contexts:
if Γ = (α1 : P1, . . . , αn : Pn), |Γ|E = (α1 : |P1|E, . . . , αn :
|Pn|E). We also write σ ∈ |Γ|E when σ is of the form
[π1/α1, . . . , πn/αn] with πi ∈ |Pi|E for all i.
Definition 10. If π is a proof term with free variables
α1, . . . , αn and Y,X1, . . . ,Xn are reducibility candidates, we
say that π is (α1 : X1, . . . , αn : Xn ⊢ Y)-reducible if π[π′i/αi]i ∈
Y for any (π′i)i ∈ (Xi)i. When it is not ambiguous, we may
omit the variables and simply say that π is (X1, . . . ,Xn ⊢ Y)-
reducible.
Definition 11. A pre-model M is a pre-model of ≡ iff it ac-
cords the same interpretation to formulas that are congruent.
In the rest of this section, we assume that M is a pre-model
of the congruence, and we show that if Γ ⊢ π : P has a proof
then π is (|Γ|E ⊢ |P|E)-reducible. In order to do so, we prove
adequacy lemmas which show that each typing rule can be
simulated in the interpretation.
Lemma 5. The following properties hold for any context E.
(⊃) – If π is (α : |P|E ⊢ |Q|E)-reducible,
then λα.π ∈ |P ⊃ Q|E.
– If π ∈ |P ⊃ Q|E and π′ ∈ |P|E, then π π′ ∈ |Q|E.
(∧) – If π1 ∈ |P1|E and π2 ∈ |P2|E, then 〈π1, π2〉 ∈ |P1∧P2|E.
– If π ∈ |P1 ∧ P2|E,
then proj1(π) ∈ |P1|E and proj2(π) ∈ |P2|E.
(∨) – If π ∈ |Pi|E for i ∈ {1, 2}, then ini(π) ∈ |P1 ∨ P2|E.
– If π ∈ |P1 ∨ P2|E and each πi is (α : |Pi|E ⊢ |Q|E)-
reducible, then δ∨(π, α.π1, α.π2) ∈ |Q|E.
(⊤) – The proof 〈〉 belongs to |⊤|E.
(⊥) – If π ∈ |⊥|E, then δ⊥(π) ∈ |P|E for any P.
(∀) – If π[t/x] ∈ |P[t/x]|E for any t, then λx.π ∈ |∀x. P|E.
– If π ∈ |∀x. P|E, then π t ∈ |P[t/x]|E.
(∃) – If π ∈ |P[t/x]|E, then 〈t, π〉 ∈ |∃x. P|E.
– If π ∈ |∃x. P|E and π′[t/x] is (α : |P[t/x]|E ⊢ |Q|E)-
reducible for any t, then δ∃(π, x.α.π′) ∈ |Q|E.
(=) – refl ∈ |t = t|E.
– If π ∈ |tθ = t′θ|E, σ ∈ |Γθ|E and π′iθ′ is
(|Γθiθ′|E ⊢ |Pθiθ′|E)-reducible for any i and θ′, then
δ=(Γ, θ, σ, t, t′, P, π, (θi.πi)i) ∈ |Pθ|E.
(µ) – If π ∈ |B(µB)~t|E, then µ(B, ~t, π) ∈ |µB~t|E.
(ν) – If π ∈ |νB~t|E, then δν(B, ~t, π) ∈ |B(νB)~t|E.
Proof: These observations are proved easily using stan-
dard proof techniques on candidates. We illustrate only a
few cases here; more details may be found in Appendix I.
For the case of least fixed point introductions, we have
|µB~t|E = lfp(φ)(~t) = φ(|µB|E)(~t) by Definition 9, and thus
|µB~t|E = { ρ ∈ SN | ρ →∗ µ(B, ~t, π′) implies π′ ∈ |B(µB)~t|E }
by Lemma 4, from which it is easy to conclude. Similarly, we
observe that |νB~t|E = { π | δν(B, ~t, π) ∈ |B(νB)~t|E } from which
the greatest fixed point elimination case follows immediately.
Finally, the equality elimination case is proved by induction
on the strong normalizability of the subderivations π, σ and
πi. In order to show that a neutral term belongs to a candidate,
it suffices to consider all its one-step reducts. Reductions
occurring inside subterms are handled by induction hypothesis.
We may also have a toplevel redex when tθ ≡ t′θ and π = refl,
reducing to πiθ′σ where θ′ is such that θiθ′ ≡ θ. By hypothesis,
πiθ
′ is (|Γθiθ′|E ⊢ |Pθiθ′|E)-reducible and σ ∈ |Γθ|E = |Γθiθ′|E,
and thus we have πiθ′σ ∈ |Pθ|E as expected.
Although adequacy is easily proved for our new equality
formulation, a few important observations should be made
here. First, the proof crucially relies on the fact that we are
considering only syntactic pre-models, and not the general
notion of pre-model of Dowek and Werner where terms may
be interpreted in arbitrary structures. This requirement makes
sense conceptually, since closed-world equality internalizes
the fact that equality can only hold when the congruence
allows it, and is thus incompatible with further equalities that
could hold in non-trivial semantic interpretations. Second, the
suspension of proof-level substitutions in equality elimination
goes hand in hand with the independence of interpretations
for different predicate instances, which in turn is necessary to
interpret recursive definitions. Indeed, when applying a proof-
level substitution σ ∈ |Γ|E on an eager equality elimination,
we are forced to apply the csu substitutions on σ, and we
need σ ∈ |Γθi|E which essentially forces us to have a term-
independent interpretation [3].
We now address the adequacy of functoriality, induction and
coinduction.
Lemma 6. Let π be a proof, and let X and X′ be predicate
candidates such that π[~t/~x] is (α : X~t ⊢ X′~t)-reducible for any
~t. If B is a monotonic (resp. antimonotonic) operator, then
F+B(~x.α.π) ∈ |BX ⊃ BX′| (resp. F−B(~x.α.π) ∈ |BX′ ⊃ BX|).
Lemma 7. Let π be a proof and X a predicate candidate. If
π[~t/~x] is (α : |B|X~t ⊢ X~t)-reducible for any ~t, then δµ(β, ~x.α.π)
is (β : |µB~t′| ⊢ X~t′)-reducible for any ~t′.
Lemma 8. Let π be a proof and X a predicate candidate. If
π[~t/~x] is (α : X~t ⊢ |B|X~t)-reducible for any ~t, then ν(β, ~x.α.π)
is (β : X~t′ ⊢ |νB~t′|)-reducible for any ~t′.
Proof: These lemmas must be proved simultaneously, in a
generalized form that is detailed in Appendix I. There is no
essential difficulty in proving the functoriality lemma, using
previously proved adequacy properties as well as the other two
lemmas for the fixed point cases. The next two lemmas are the
interesting ones, since they involve using the properties of the
fixed point interpretations to justify the (co)induction rules. In
the case of induction, we need to establish that δµ(ρ, ~x.α.π) ∈
X~t when ρ ∈ |µB~t|. In order to do this, it suffices to show that
Y := ~t 7→ { ρ | δµ(ρ, ~x.α.π) ∈ X~t } is included in |µB|. This
follows from the fact that Y is a pre-fixed point of the operator
φ such that |µB| = lfp(φ), which can be proved easily using
the adequacy property for functoriality. We proceed similarly
for the coinduction rule, showing that
Y := ~t 7→ { π ∈ SN | π →∗ ν(ρ, ~x.α.π) implies ρ ∈ X~t and
π[~t′/~x] is (α : X~t′ ⊢ |B|X~t′)-reducible for any ~t′ }
is a post-fixed point of the operator φ such that |νB| = gfp(φ).
In both cases, note that the candidate Y is a priori not the
interpretation of any predicate; this is where we use the power
of reducibility candidates.
Theorem 2 (Adequacy). Let ≡ be a congruence, M be a pre-
model of ≡ and Γ ⊢ π : P be a derivable judgment. Then
πσ ∈ |P| for any substitution σ ∈ |Γ|.
Proof: By induction on the height of π, using the previous
adequacy properties.
The usual corollaries hold. Since variables belong to any
candidate by condition (3), we can take σ to be the identity
substitution, and obtain that any well-typed proof is strongly
normalizable. Together with Lemma 3, this means that our
logic is consistent. Note that the suspended computations in
the (co)induction and equality elimination rules do not affect
these corollaries, because they can only occur in normal forms
of specific types. For instance, equality elimination cannot
hide a non-terminating computation if there is no equality
assumption in the context.
V. Recursive Definitions
We now identify a class of rewrite rules relative to which
we can always build a pre-model. This class supports recursive
definitions whose use we illustrate through a sound formaliza-
tion of a Tait-style argument.
A. Recursive rewriting that admits a pre-model
The essential idea behind recursive definitions is that they
are formed gradually, following the inductive structure of one
of their arguments, or more generally a well-founded order
on arguments. In order to reflect this idea into a pre-model
construction, we need to identify all the atom interpretations
that could be involved in the interpretation of a given formula.
This is the purpose of the next definition.
Definition 12. We say that P may occur in Q when P = P′θ,
P′ occurs in Q, and θ is a substitution for variables quantified
over in Q.
For example, (a t) may occur in (a′ x ∧ ∃y. a y) for any t.
Theorem 3. Let ≡ be a congruence defined by a rewrite
system rewriting terms to terms and atomic propositions to
propositions, and let M be a pre-model of ≡. Consider the
addition of new predicate symbols a1, . . . , an in the language,
together with the extension of the congruence resulting from
the addition of rewrite rules of the form ai~t  B. There
is a pre-model of the extended congruence in the extended
language, provided that the following conditions hold.
(1) If (ai~t)θ ≡ (ai~t′)θ′, ai~t B and ai~t′  B′, then Bθ ≡ B′θ′.
(2) There exists a well-founded order ≺ such that a j~t′ ≺ (ai~t)θ
whenever ai~t B and a j~t′ may occur in B′θ.
Note that condition (1) is not obviously satisfied, even
when there is a single rule per atom. Consider, for example,
a (0 × x)  a′ x in a setting where 0 × x ≡ 0: our condition
requires that a′ x ≡ a′ y for any x and y, which is a priori
not guaranteed. Condition (2) restricts the use of quantifiers
but still allows useful constructions. Consider for example
the Ackermann relation, built using a double induction on its
first two parameters: ack 0 x (s x)  ⊤, ack (s x) 0 y  
ack x (s 0) y and ack (s x) (s y) z ∃r. ack (s x) y r∧ack x r z.
The third rule requires that ack x r z ≺ ack (s x) (s y) z for any
x, y, z and r, which is indeed satisfied with a lexicographic
ordering.
Proof: We only present the main idea here; a detailed proof
may be found in Appendix I. We first build pre-models Mai~t
that are compatible with instances a j~t′  B of the new rewrite
rules for a j~t′  ai~t. This is done gradually following the order
≺, using a well-founded induction on ai~t. We build Mai~t by
aggregating smaller pre-modelsMa j~t′ for a j~t′ ≺ ai~t, and adding
the interpretation aˆi~t. To define it, we consider rule instances
of the form ai~t  B. If there is none we use a dummy
interpretation: aˆi~t = SN . Otherwise, condition (1) imposes
that there is essentially a single possible such rewrite modulo
the congruence, so it suffices to choose |B| as the interpretation
aˆi~t to satisfy the new rewrite rules. Finally, we aggregate
interpretations from all the pre-models Mai~t to obtain a pre-
model of the full extended congruence.
This result can be used to obtain pre-models for complex
definition schemes, such as ones that iterate and interleave
groups of fixed-point and recursive definitions. Consider, for
example, a (s n)  a n ⊃ a (s n). While this rewrite rule
does not directly satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3, it can
be rewritten into the form a (s n) µQ. a n ⊃ Q, which does
satisfy these conditions.
B. An application of recursive definitions
Our example application is the formalization of the Tait-
style argument of strong normalizability for the simply typed
λ-calculus. We assume term-level sorts tm and ty corre-
sponding to representations of λ-terms and simple types, and
symbols ι : ty, arrow : ty → ty → ty, app : tm → tm → tm
and abs : (tm → tm) → tm. We identify well-formed types
through an inductive predicate:
isty de f= µ(λTλt. t = ι ∨ ∃t′∃t′′. t = arrow t′ t′′ ∧ T t′ ∧ T t′′)
We assume a definition of term reduction and strong normal-
ization, denoting the latter predicate by sn. Finally, we define
red m t, expressing that m is a reducible λ-term of type t, by
the following rewrite rules:
red m ι  sn m
red m (arrow t t′)  ∀n. red n t ⊃ red (app m n) t′
This definition satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3, taking
as ≺ the order induced by the subterm ordering on the second
argument of red. We can thus safely use it.
With these definitions, our logic allows us to mirror very
closely the strong normalization proof presented in [12]. For
instance, consider proving that reducible terms are strongly
normalizing:
∀m∀t. isty t ⊃ red m t ⊃ sn m
The paper proof is by induction on types, which corresponds
in the formalization to an elimination on isty t. In the base
case, we have to derive red m ι ⊃ sn m which is simply
an instance of P ⊃ P modulo our congruence. In the arrow
case, we must prove red m (arrow t t′) ⊃ sn m. The
hypothesis red m (arrow t t′) is congruent to ∀n. red n t ⊃
red (app m n) t′ and we can show that variables are always
reducible,1 which gives us red (app m x) t′. From there, we
obtain sn (app m x) by induction hypothesis, from which we
can deduce sn m with a little more work.
The full formalization, which is too detailed to present
here, is shown in Appendix II. It has been tested using the
proof assistant Abella [9]. The logic that underlies Abella fea-
tures fixed-point definitions, closed-world equality and generic
quantification. The last notion is useful when dealing with
binding structures, and we have employed it in our formal-
ization although it is not available yet in our logic. Abella
does not actually support recursive definitions. To get around
this fact, we have entered the one we need as an inductive
definition, and ignored the warning provided about the non-
monotonic clause while making sure to use an unfolding of this
inductive definition in the proof only when this is allowed for
recursive definitions. In the future, we plan to extend Abella
to support recursive definitions based on the theory developed
in this paper. This would mean allowing such definitions as a
separate class, building in a test that they satisfy the criterion
described in Theorem 3 and properly restricting the use of
these definitions in proofs. Such an extension is obviously
compatible with all the current capabilities of Abella and
would support additional reasoning that is justifiably sound.
VI. Related and FutureWork
The logical system that we have developed is obviously
related to deduction modulo. In essence, it extends that
system with a simple yet powerful treatment of fixed-point
definitions. The additional power is obtained from two new
features: fixed-point combinators and closed-world equality.
If our focus is only on provability, the capabilities arising
from these features may perhaps be encoded in deduction
modulo. Dowek and Werner provide an encoding of arithmetic
in deduction modulo, and also show how to build pre-models
for some more general fixed-point constructs [8]. Regarding
equality, Allali [1] has shown that a more algorithmic version
of equality may be defined through the congruence, which
allows to simplify some equations by computing. Thus, it
simulates some aspects of closed-world equality. However,
the principle of substitutivity has to be recovered through a
complex encoding involving inductions on the term structures.
In any case, our concern here is not simply with provability;
in general, we do not follow the project of deduction modulo
to have a logic as basic as possible in which stronger systems
are then encoded. Rather, we seek to obtain meaningful proof
structures, whose study can reveal useful information. For
instance, in the context of proof-search, it has been shown that
a direct treatment of fixed-point definitions allows for stronger
focused proof systems [3] which have served as a basis for
1This actually has to be proved simultaneously with red m t ⊃ sn m, but
we ignore it for the simplicity of the presentation.
several proof-search implementations [4], [5]. This goal also
justifies why we do not simply use powerful systems such as
the Calculus of Inductive Constructions [17] which obviously
supports inductive as well as recursive definitions; here again
we highlight the simplicity of our (co)induction rules and of
our rich equality elimination principle.
Our logic is also related to logics of fixed-point defini-
tions [14], [18], [22]. The system we have described represents
an advance over these logics in that it adds to them a rewriting
capability. As we have seen, this capability can be used to
blend computation and deduction in natural ways and add
support for recursive definitions — a similar support may also
be obtained in other ways [21]. Our work also makes important
contributions to the understanding of closed-world equality.
We have shown that it is compatible with an equational theory
on terms. We have, in addition, resolved some problematic
issues related to this notion that affect the stability of finite
proofs under reduction. This has allowed us to prove for the
first time a strong normalizability result for logics of fixed-
point definitions. Our calculus is, at this stage, missing a
treatment of generic quantification present in some of the
alternative logics [10], [11], [16]. We plan to include this
feature in the future, and do not foresee any difficulty in doing
so since it has typically been added in a modular fashion to
such logics. This addition would make our logic an excellent
choice for formalizing the meta-theory of computational and
logical systems.
An important topic for further investigation of our system is
proof search. The distinction between computation and deduc-
tion is critical for theorem proving with fixed point definitions.
For instance, in the Tac system [5], which is based on logics
of definitions, automated (co)inductive theorem proving relies
heavily on ad-hoc annotations that identify computations. In
that context, our treatment of recursive definitions seems
like a good candidate more a more principled separation
of computation and deduction. Finally, now that we have
refactored equality rules to simplify the proof normalization
process, we should study their proof search behavior. The new
equality elimination rule seems difficult to analyze at first.
However, we hope to gain some insights from studying its use
in settings where the old rule (which it subsumes) is practically
satisfactory, progressively moving to newer contexts where
it offers advantages. We note in this regard that the new
complexity is in fact welcome: the earlier infinitely branching
treatments of closed-world equality had a simple proof-search
treatment in theory, but did not provide a useful handle to
study the practical difficulties of automated theorem proving
with complex equalities.
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Appendix I: Proofs of Lemmas and Theorems
A. Proof of Lemma 3
We first observe that typed normal forms are characterized
as usual: no introduction term is ever found as the main
parameter of an elimination. This standard property is not
affected by our new constructs. For example, consider the
case of equality: δ=(. . . , refl, (θi.πi)i) can always be reduced
by definition of complete sets of unifiers. The rest of the
argument follows the usual lines: the proof cannot end with
an elimination, otherwise it would have to be a chain of
eliminations terminated with a proof variable, but the context
is empty; it also cannot end with an introduction since there
is no introduction for ⊥ and the congruence cannot equate it
with another connective.
B. Proof of Lemma 5
All introduction rules are treated in a similar fashion:
• If π is (α : |P| ⊢ |Q|)-reducible, then λα.π ∈ |P ⊃ Q|.
First, λα.π is SN, like all reducible proof-terms, because
variables belong to all candidates, and candidates are sets
of SN proofs. Now, assuming λα.π →∗ λα.π′, we seek
to establish that π′[π′′/α] ∈ |Q| for any π′′ ∈ |P|. By
definition of reducibility, π[π′′/α] belongs to |Q|, and we
conclude by stability of candidates under reduction since
π[π′′/α] →∗ π′[π′′/α].
• The cases for ∧, ∨ and ∃ are proved similarly.
• The cases for ⊤ and equality are trivial.
• If π[t/x] ∈ |P[t/x]| for any t, then λx.π ∈ |∀x. P|.
Assume λx.π →∗ λx.π′. It must be the case that π →∗ π′,
and for any ~t we have π[t/x] →∗ π′[t/x] by Proposition 1
and thus π′[t/x] ∈ |P[t/x]| as needed.
• If π ∈ |B(µB)~t|, then µ(B, ~t, π) ∈ |µB~t|.
From Definition 9, we have |µB~t| = lfp(φ)(~t) = φ(|µB|)(~t).
Using Lemma 4, we obtain that |µB~t| = { ρ ∈ SN | ρ →∗
µ(B, ~t, π′) implies π′ ∈ |B(µB)~t| }. It is now easy to see
that π ∈ |B(µB)~t| implies µ(B, ~t, π) ∈ |µB~t|: for any
reduction µ(B, ~t, π) →∗ µ(B, ~t, π′) it must be the case that
π →∗ π′ and thus π′ ∈ |B(µB)~t|.
Elimination rules also follow a common scheme:
• If π ∈ |P ⊃ Q| and π′ ∈ |P|, then π π′ ∈ |Q|.
We proceed by induction on the strong normalizability
of π and π′. By the candidate of reducibility condition
on neutral terms, it suffices to show that all immediate
reducts π π′ → π′′ belong to |Q|. If π′′ is obtained by a
reduction inside π or π′, then we conclude by induction
hypothesis since the resulting subterm still belongs to the
expected interpretation. Otherwise, it must be that π =
λα.ρ and the reduct is ρ[π′/α]. In that case we conclude
by definition of π ∈ |P ⊃ Q|.
• The cases of ∧, ∨ and ⊥ are treated similarly.
• If π ∈ |∀x. P|, then π t ∈ |P[t/x]|.
We proceed by induction on the strong normalizability of
π, considering all one-step reducts of the neutral term π t.
Internal reductions are handled by induction hypothesis.
If π = λx.π′, our term may reduce at toplevel into π′[t/x].
In that case we conclude by definition of |∀x. P|.
• If π ∈ |∃x. P| and π′[t/x] is (α : |P[t/x]| ⊢ |Q|)-reducible
for any t, then δ∃(π, x.α.π′) ∈ |Q|.
We proceed by induction on the strong normalizability of
π and π′, considering all one-step reducts. The internal re-
ductions are handled by induction hypothesis. A toplevel
reduction into π′[t/x][π′′/α] may occur when π = 〈t, π′′〉
in which case we have π′′ ∈ |P[t/x]| by hypothesis on π
and definition of |∃x. P|. We conclude by hypothesis on
π′[t/x].
• If π ∈ |tθ = t′θ|, σ ∈ |Γθ| and π′iθ′ is
(|Γθiθ′| ⊢ |Pθiθ′|)-reducible for any i and θ′, then
δ=(Γ, θ, σ, t, t′, P, π, (θi.πi)i) ∈ |Pθ|.
We proceed by induction on the strong normalizability
of the subderivations π, σ and πi. In order to show
that a neutral term belongs to a candidate, it suffices to
consider all its one-step reducts. Reductions occurring
inside subterms are handled by induction hypothesis.
We may also have a toplevel redex when tθ ≡ t′θ and
π = refl, reducing to πiθ′σ where θ′ is such that θiθ′ ≡ θ.
By hypothesis, πiθ′ is (|Γθiθ′| ⊢ |Pθiθ′|)-reducible and
σ ∈ |Γθ| = |Γθiθ
′|, and thus we have πiθ′σ ∈ |Pθ| as
expected.
• The case of δν is singular, as it follows directly from the
definition of the interpretation of greatest fixed points. In-
deed, we obtain exactly |νB~t| = { π | δν(B, ~t, π) ∈ |B(νB)~t| }
by unfolding the interpretation of greatest fixed points
like we did for the least fixed point case above, using
Definition 9 and Lemma 4.
C. Proof of Lemmas 6, 7 and 8
Let us first introduce the following notation for conciseness:
we say that π is (~x,X~x ⊢ Y~x)-reducible when π[~t/~x] is (X~t ⊢
Y~t)-reducible for any ~t.
We prove the three lemmas simultaneously, generalized as
follows for a predicate operator B of second-order arity2 n+1,
predicates ~A and predicate candidates ~Z:
(1) For any (~x,X~x ⊢ X′~x)-reducible π, F+
B ~A
(~x.α.π) ∈ |B~ZX ⊃
B~ZX′|.
(2) For any (~x,X~x ⊢ X′~x)-reducible π, F−
B ~A
(~x.α.π) ∈ |B~ZX′ ⊃
B~ZX|.
(3) For any (~x, |B|~ZX~x ⊢ X~x)-reducible π, δµ(β, ~x.α.π) is
(|µ(B~Z)~t| ⊢ X~t)-reducible.
(4) For any (~x,X~x ⊢ |B|~ZX~x)-reducible π, ν(β, ~x.α.π) is (X~t ⊢
|ν(B~Z)~t|)-reducible.
We proceed by induction on the number of logical connectives
in B. The purpose of the generalization is to keep formulas
~A out of the picture: those are potentially large but are
treated atomically in the definition of functoriality, moreover
they will be interpreted by candidates ~Z which may not be
interpretations of formulas. We first prove (3) and (4) by
relying on smaller instances of (1), then we show (1) and
2In (1) and (2), B has type on+1 → o. In (3) and (4) we are considering B
of type on → (~γ → o) → (~γ → o).
. . . ⊢ β : ν (B P)~t
. . . ⊢ δν(B P, ~x, γ) : B P (ν (B P)) ~x . . . ⊢ F+(λp.B p (ν (B P)) ~x)(~x.α.π) : B P (ν (B P))~x ⊃ B P′ (ν (B P)) ~x
. . . , γ : ν (B P) ~x ⊢ (F∗(λp.B p (ν (B P)) ~x)(~x.α.π)) δν(B P, ~x, γ) : B P′ (ν (B P))~x
Γ, β : ν (B P)~t ⊢ ν(β, . . .) : ν (B P′) ~t
Γ ⊢ F+
λp.ν (B p)~t(~x.α.π) : ν (B P)~t ⊃ ν (B P′)~t
Fig. 7. Typing functoriality for greatest fixed-points
(2) by relying on smaller instances of all four properties but
also instances of (3) and (4) for an operator of the same size.
(1) We proceed by case analysis on B. When B = λ~pλq.q~t, we
have to establish that F+
B ~A
(~x.α.π) = λβ.π[~t/~x][β/α] ∈ |P~t ⊃
P~t′|. It simply follows from Lemma 5 and the hypothesis
on π. When B = λ~pλq.B′~p where q does not occur in B′,
we have to show F+
B ~A
(~x.α.π) = λβ.β ∈ |B′~Z ⊃ B′~Z|, which
is trivial.
In all other cases, we use the adequacy properties and
conclude by induction hypothesis. Most cases are straight-
forward, relying on the adequacy properties. In the im-
plication case, i.e., B is B1 ⊃ B2, we use induction
hypothesis (2) on B1 and (1) on B2. Let us only detail
the least fixed point case:
F+
λq.µ(B ~Aq)~t(~x.α.π)
de f
=
λβ. δµ(β, ~x.γ.µ(B~AP′, ~x, F+
λq.B ~Aq(µ(B ~AP′))~x(~x.α.π)γ))
By induction hypothesis (1) with B :=
λ~pλpn+1λq.B~pqpn+1~x, An+1 := µ(B~AP′) and
Zn+1 := |µ(B~ZX′)|, we have:
F+...(~x.α.π) ∈ |B~ZX(µ(B~ZX′))~x ⊃ B~ZX′(µ(B~ZX′))~x|
We can now apply the ⊃-elimination and µ-introduction
principles to obtain that µ(B~AP′, ~x, (F+...(~x.α.π))γ) is (γ :
|B~ZX(µ(B~ZX′))~x| ⊢ |µ(B~ZX′)~x|)-reducible. Finally, we
conclude using induction hypothesis (3) with B :=
λ~pλpn+1λqλ~x. B~ppn+1q~x, An+1 := P, Zn+1 := X and
X := |µ(B~ZX′)|: F+
λq.µ(B ~Aq)~t is (|µ(B~ZX)~t| ⊢ |µ(B~ZX
′)~t|)-
reducible.
(2) Antimonotonicity: symmetric of monotonicity, without
the variable case.
(3) Induction: we seek to establish that δµ(ρ, ~x.α.π) ∈ X~t
when ρ ∈ |µ(B~Z)~t| and π is (~x, |B|~ZX~x ⊢ X~x)-reducible.
We shall show that |µ(B~Z)~t| is included in the set of proofs
for which this holds, by showing that (a) this set is a
candidate and (b) it is a prefixed point of φ such that
|µ(B~Z)~t| = lfp(φ). Let us consider
Y := ~t 7→ { ρ | δµ(ρ, ~x.α.π) ∈ X~t }
First, Y~t is a candidate for any ~t: conditions (1) and
(2) are inherited from X~t, only condition (3) is non-
trivial. Assuming that every one-step reduct of a neutral
derivation ρ belongs to Y, we prove δµ(ρ, ~x.α.π) ∈ X~t.
This is done by induction on the strong normalizability
of π. Using condition (3) on X~t, it suffices to consider
one-step reducts: if the reduction takes place in ρ we
conclude by hypothesis; if it takes place in π we conclude
by induction hypothesis; finally, it cannot take place at
toplevel because ρ is neutral.
We now establish that φ(Y) ⊆ Y: assuming ρ ∈
φ(Y)~t, we show that δµ(ρ, ~x.α.π) ∈ X~t. This is done
by induction on the strong normalizability of ρ and
π, and it suffices to show that each one step reduct
belongs to X~t, with internal reductions handled sim-
ply by induction hypothesis. Therefore we consider the
case where ρ = µ(B~A, ~t, π′) and our derivation reduces
to π[~t/~x][Fλq.B ~Aq~t(~x.β.δµ(β, ~x.α.π))π′/α]. Now, recall that
π[~t/~x] is (|B~Z|X~t ⊢ X~t)-reducible. Since µ(B~A, ~t, π′) = ρ ∈
φ(Y)~t, we also have π′ ∈ |B~ZY~t|. By induction hypothesis
(1) we obtain that Fλq.B ~Aq~t(~x.β.δµ(β, ~x.α.π)) is (|B~ZY~t| ⊢
|B~ZX~t|)-reducible, since δµ(β, ~x.α.π) is (~x, β : Y~x ⊢ X~x)-
reducible by definition of Y. We conclude by composing
all that.
(4) Coinduction is similar to induction. Let us consider
Y := ~t 7→ { π ∈ SN | π →∗ ν(ρ, ~x.α.π) implies
ρ ∈ X~t and π is (~x, α : X~x ⊢ |B|~ZX~x)-reducible }
It is easy to show that Y is a predicate candidate, and if
we show that Y ⊆ |ν(B~Z)| we can conclude because the
properties on ρ and π are preserved by reduction.
We have |ν(B~Z)| = gfp(φ), so it suffices to establish that
Y is a post-fixed point of φ, or in other words that for any
~t and π ∈ Y~t, δν(B~A, ~t, π) ∈ |B|~ZY~t. We do this as usual
by induction on the strong normalizability of π and the
only interesting case to consider is the toplevel reduction,
which can occur when π = ν(ρ, ~x.α.π′). The reduct is
Fλp.B ~Ap~t(~x.β.ν(β, ~x.α.π′)) (π′[~t/~x][ρ/α]). It does belong to
|B~ZY~t| because: ρ ∈ X~t by definition of π ∈ Y~t; π′[~t/~x]
is (α : X~t ⊢ |B|~ZX~t)-reducible for the same reason; and
finally Fλp. B ~Ap~t(~x.β.ν(β, ~x.α.π′)) ∈ |B~ZX~t ⊃ B~ZY~t| by
(1) since ν(α, ~x.α.π′) is (~x;α : X~x ⊢ Y~x)-reducible by
definition of Y.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
We proceed by induction on the height of π. If π is a
variable, then πσ = σ(α). Thus, it belongs to |Γ(α)| by
hypothesis, and since we are considering a pre-model of the
congruence, and P ≡ Γ(α), we have πσ ∈ |P|.
Other cases follow from the adequacy properties established
previously. For instance, if π is of the form λα.π′, then
P ≡ P1 ⊃ P2 and |P| = |P1 ⊃ P2|. By induction hypothesis,
π′ is (Γ, α : |P1| ⊢ |P2|)-reducible. Equivalently, π′σ is
(|P1| ⊢ |P2|)-reducible, and we conclude using Lemma 5. In the
case where π = λx.π′, we need to establish that each π′σ[t/x]
belongs to |P′[t/x]|. We obtain this by induction hypothesis,
since π′[t/x] has the same height as π′, which is smaller
than π, and we do have Γ[t/x] ⊢ π′[t/x] : P′[t/x]. Simi-
larly, when π = δ=(Γ′, θ′, σ′, t, t′, P′, π′, (θi.πi)i), we establish
πσ ∈ |P′θ′| by using the induction hypothesis to obtain that
σ′σ ∈ |Γ′θ′|, π′σ ∈ |tθ′ = ~t′θ′| and, for any i and θ′′, πiθ′′ is
(|Γ′θiθ′′| ⊢ |P′θiθ′′|)-reducible.
E. Proof of Theorem 3
We define ≡ai~t (resp. ≡≺ai~t) to be the congruence resulting
from the extension of ≡ with rule instances a j~t′  B for
a j~t′  ai~t (resp. a j~t′ ≺ ai~t). Let us also write P  ai~t (resp.
P ≺ ai~t) when a j~t′  ai~t (resp. a j~t′ ≺ ai~t) for any a j~t′ which
may occur in P. We shall build a family of pre-models Mai~t
such that:
(a) for any ai~t ≺ a j~t′, |a j~t′|
Mai~t
= SN ;
(b) for any P  a j~t′ and a j~t′ ≺ ai~t, |P|
M
a j ~t′
= |P|
Mai~t
;
(c) Mai~t is a pre-model of ≡ai~t.
We proceed by well-founded induction. Assuming that Ma j~t′
is defined for all a j~t′ ≺ ai~t, we shall thus build Mai~t.
We first define M≺ai~t by taking each aˆ j~t′ to be the same as
in Ma j~t′ when a j~t′ ≺ ai~t and SN otherwise. By this definition
and property (b) of our pre-models, we have
|P|
M≺ai~t
= |P|
M
a j ~t′
for any P  a j~t′ and a j~t′ ≺ ai~t.
Next, we observe that M≺ai~t is a pre-model of ≡≺ai~t. It suffices
to check it separately for each rewrite rule. An instance P Q
of a rule defining the initial congruence cannot involve the new
predicates, so in that case we do have
|P|
M≺ai~t
= |P|M = |Q|M = |Q|M≺ai~t .
For a rule instance a j~t′  B with a j~t′ ≺ ai~t, the property is
similarly inherited from Ma j~t′ because B  a j~t
′ by (2):
|a j~t′|
M≺ai~t
= |a j~t′|
M
a j ~t′
= |B|
M
a j~t′
= |B|
M≺ai~t
We finally build Mai~t to be the same as M≺ai~t except for
aˆi~t which is defined as follows:
• If there is no rule ai ~t′′  B such that ~t′′θ ≡ ~t, we define
aˆi~t to be SN .
• Otherwise, pick any such B, and define aˆi~t to be |Bθ|
M≺ai~t
.
This is uniquely defined: for any other ai~t′  B′ such
that ai~t = (ai~t′)θ′, we have Bθ ≡ B′θ′ by (1), and thus
|B′θ′|
M≺ai~t
= |Bθ|
M≺ai~t
since M≺ai~t is a fortiori a pre-model
of ≡.
This extended pre-model satisfies (a) by construction. It is also
simple to show that it satifies (b). To check that it verifies
(c) we check separately each instance of a rewrite rule: by
construction, our pre-model is compatible with instances of
the form ai~t B, and it inherits that property from M≺ai~t for
other instances.
Finally, we define our new pre-model M′ by taking each
aˆi~t in Mai~t. It is a pre-model of the extended congruence: it
is easy to check that it is compatible with all rewrite rules.
Appendix II: Formalization of Strong Normalizability
We detail below the formalization of Tait’s strong nor-
malizability argument described in Section V. The full
Abella scripts are available at http://www.lix.polytechnique.
fr/∼dbaelde/lics12.
Following the two-level reasoning methodology facilitated
by Abella, we first define the objects and judgments of
interest in a module file shown on Figure 8. The specification
is given by means of hereditary Harrop clauses3. Adequate
representations are obtained by considering uniform proofs for
the corresponding clauses. For instance, uniform proofs of Γ ⊢
o f M T are in bijection with typing derivations in simply typed
λ-calculus. Abella allows one to reason over the specified
objects through this representation methodology. Derivability
is inductively defined as a builtin predicate in Abella, written
in a concise notation: {C |- of M T} corresponds to the
derivability of C ⊢ o f M T . More details on the methodology
and syntax of Abella, refer to http://abella.cs.umn.edu.
A. Preliminaries
We first prove that steps is transitive and that it is a
congruence.
Theorem steps_steps : forall M N P,
{steps M N} -> {steps N P} ->
{steps M P}.
Theorem steps_app_left : forall M M’ N,
{steps M M’} -> {steps (app M N) (app M’ N)}.
Theorem steps_app_right : forall M M’ N,
{steps M M’} -> {steps (app N M) (app N M’)}.
Theorem steps_app : forall M M’ N N’,
{steps M M’} -> {steps N N’} ->
{steps (app M N) (app M’ N’)}.
Theorem steps_abs : forall M M’, nabla x,
{steps (M x) (M’ x)} ->
{steps (abs M) (abs M’)}.
Next, we define open terms, which cannot be done at the
specification level like, for example, the definition of isty.
We prove a few basic properties of open terms.
Define isotm : tm -> prop by
nabla x, isotm x ;
isotm (app M N) := isotm M /\ isotm N ;
isotm (abs M) := nabla x, isotm (M x).
Theorem isotm_subst : forall M N, nabla x,
3These clauses also define a λProlog, which gives a way to execute them
directly.
isty iota. step (app (abs M) N) (M N).
isty (arrow T T’) :- isty T, isty T’. step (app M N) (app M’ N) :- step M M’.
step (app M N) (app M N’) :- step N N’.
istm (app M N) :- istm M, istm N. step (abs M) (abs M’) :- pi x\ step (M x) (M’ x).
istm (abs M) :- pi x\ istm x => istm (M x).
steps M M.
of (app M N) T’ :- of N T, of M (arrow T T’). steps M N :- step M M’, steps M’ N.
of (abs M) (arrow T T’) :-
isty T, pi x\ of x T => of (M x) T’. subst (app M N) (app M’ N’) :-
subst M M’, subst N N’.
subst (abs M) (abs M’) :-
pi x\ pi y\ subst x y => subst (M x) (M’ y).
Fig. 8. Module file for the Abella formalization
isotm (M x) -> isotm N -> isotm (M N).
Theorem isotm_step : forall M M’,
isotm M -> {step M M’} -> isotm M’.
Theorem step_osubst_steps : forall M N N’, nabla x,
isotm (M x) -> {step N N’} -> {steps (M N) (M N’)}.
B. Strong normalizability
We define strong normalizability and prove some basic
properties about it.
Define sn : tm -> prop by
sn M := forall N, {step M N} -> sn N.
Theorem var_sn : nabla x, sn x.
Theorem sn_step_sn : forall M N,
sn M -> {step M N} -> sn N.
Theorem sn_preserve : forall M, nabla x,
sn (app M x) -> sn M.
Theorem sn_app : forall M N,
sn M -> sn N ->
(forall M’, {steps M (abs M’)} -> false) ->
sn (app M N).
C. Reducibility
We now give the definition of reducibility. Abella issues a
warning here, because the definition is not monotone, and is
thus not formally supported by its underlying theory. However,
as explained in Section V, this recursive definition can be
justified as rewrite rules in our framework. Below, it is always
going to be used following this interpretation.
Define red : tm -> ty -> prop by
red M iota := sn M ;
red M (arrow T T’) := forall N,
isotm N -> red N T -> red (app M N) T’.
We now prove the three conditions defining candidates of
reducibility. We first show that reducible terms are SN, and
simultaneously that variables are reducible, which requires a
generalization to showing that x N1 . . . Nk is reducible when
the Ni are SN.
Define vargen : tm -> prop by
nabla x, vargen x ;
vargen (app M N) := vargen M /\ sn N.
Theorem vargen_step_vargen : forall M N,
vargen M -> {step M N} -> vargen N.
Theorem vargen_steps_noabs : forall M M’,
vargen M -> {steps M (abs M’)} -> false.
Theorem vargen_sn : forall M, vargen M -> sn M.
Theorem red_sn_gen : forall M T,
{isty T} ->
(red M T -> sn M) /\ (vargen M -> red M T).
Theorem var_red : forall T, nabla x,
{isty T} -> red x T.
Theorem red_sn : forall M T,
{isty T} -> red M T -> sn M.
The second condition is that reducts remain in reducibility
sets.
Theorem red_step : forall M M’ T,
{isty T} -> red M T -> {step M M’} ->
red M’ T.
Theorem red_steps : forall M M’ T,
{isty T} -> red M T -> {steps M M’} ->
red M’ T.
Finally, if all one-step reducts of a neutral term are in a
set, then so is the term. We only prove it for neutral terms
which are applications. Here, the inner induction is taken care
of using an auxiliary lemma.
Theorem cr3_aux : forall M1 M2 N T1 T’,
{isty T1} -> sn N -> isotm N -> red N T1 ->
(forall M1 M2,
(forall M’,
{step (app M1 M2) M’} -> red M’ T’) ->
red (app M1 M2) T’) ->
(forall M’,
{step (app M1 M2) M’} ->
red M’ (arrow T1 T’)) ->
red (app (app M1 M2) N) T’.
Theorem red_anti : forall M N T,
{isty T} ->
(forall M’,
{step (app M N) M’} -> red M’ T) ->
red (app M N) T.
D. Contexts
We characterize the contexts used in derivations of of M T
and subst M T that are involved in the proof of adequacy. We
also define separately their relationship, using mapctx. This
approach requires a fair number of book-keeping lemmas.
Define name : tm -> prop by nabla x, name x.
Define ofctx : olist -> prop by
ofctx nil ;
nabla x, ofctx (of x T :: C) :=
{isty T} /\ ofctx C.
Define substctx : olist -> prop by
substctx nil ;
nabla x, substctx (subst x (M x) :: C) :=
nabla x, isotm (M x) /\ substctx C.
Define mapctx : olist -> olist -> prop by
mapctx nil nil ;
nabla x,
mapctx (of x T :: C) (subst x (M x) :: C’)
:=
nabla x,
{isty T} /\ isotm (M x) /\
red (M x) T /\ mapctx C C’.
Theorem ofctx_member_isty : forall C T,
ofctx C -> member (isty T) C -> false.
Theorem isty_weaken : forall C T,
ofctx C -> {C |- isty T} -> {isty T}.
Theorem ofctx_member_isty : forall C M T,
ofctx C -> member (of M T) C -> {isty T}.
Theorem of_isty : forall C M T,
ofctx C -> {C |- of M T} -> {isty T}.
Theorem mapctx_of : forall G G’ M T,
mapctx G G’ -> member (of M T) G ->
name M /\
exists M’, red M’ T /\ member (subst M M’) G’.
Theorem mapctx_subst : forall G G’ M M’,
mapctx G G’ -> member (subst M M’) G’ ->
name M /\
exists T, red M’ T /\ member (of M T) G.
Theorem mapctx_split : forall C C’,
mapctx C C’ -> ofctx C /\ substctx C’.
Theorem ofctx_member_name : forall C M T,
ofctx C -> member (of M T) C -> name M.
Theorem of_isotm : forall C M T,
ofctx C -> { C |- of M T } -> isotm M.
Theorem substctx_member : forall C M M’,
substctx C -> member (subst M M’) C ->
name M /\ isotm M’.
Theorem subst_isotm : forall C M M’,
substctx C -> isotm M -> { C |- subst M M’ } ->
isotm M’.
Theorem member_not_fresh :
forall X L, nabla (n:tm),
member (X n) L -> exists X’, X = n\X’.
Theorem substctx_member_unique_aux :
forall C M M’, nabla x,
substctx (C x) ->
member (subst x (M x)) (C x) ->
member (subst x (M’ x)) (C x) ->
M = M’.
Theorem substctx_member_unique : forall C X M M’,
substctx C ->
member (subst X M) C ->
{C |- subst X M’} -> M = M’.
E. Adequacy theorem
Theorem abs_case : forall M N T’, nabla x,
isotm (M x) -> {isty T’} ->
sn (M x) -> sn N ->
red (M N) T’ ->
red (app (abs M) N) T’.
Theorem of_red : forall M M’ T C C’,
mapctx C C’ ->
{ C |- of M T } ->
{ C’ |- subst M M’ } ->
red M’ T.
To apply the adequacy result and obtain strong normal-
izability, it only remains to show that for any typed term
we can define the identity substitution with which we have
{ C’ |- subst M M }, from which red M T and sn M fol-
low.
